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Abstract—With an exponentially increasing usage of cloud 
services, the need for forensic investigations of virtual space is 
equally in constantly increasing demand, which includes as a 
very first approach, the gaining of access to it as well as the data 
stored. This is an aspect that faces a number of challenges, 
stemming not only from the technical difficulties and 
peculiarities, but equally covers the interaction with an emerging 
line of businesses offering cloud storage and services. Beyond the 
forensic aspects, it also covers to an ever increasing amount the 
non-forensic considerations, such as the availability of logs and 
archives, legal and data protection considerations from a global 
perspective and the clashes in between, as well as the ever 
competing interests between law enforcement to seize evidence 
which is non-physical, and businesses who need to be able to 
continue to operate and provide their hosted services, even if law 
enforcement seek to collect evidence. The trend post-Snowden 
has been unequivocally towards default encryption, and driven 
by market leaders such as Apple, motivated to a large extent by 
the perceived demands for privacy of the consumer. The central 
question to be explored in this paper is to what extent this trend 
towards default encryption will have a negative impact on law 
enforcement investigations and possibilities, and will at the end 
attempt to provide a solution, which takes into account the needs 
of both law enforcement, but also of the service providers. It is 
hoped that the recommendations from this paper will be able to 
have an impact in the ability for law enforcement to continue 
with their investigations in an efficient manner, whilst also 
safeguarding the ability for business to thrive and continue to 
develop and offer new and innovative solutions, which do not put 
law enforcement at risk.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Cybercrime has been as old as the invention of the internet, 
and arguably even predates that [1]. Where there is 
opportunity, there is crime. And where there is technology 
available which can assist crime, it will be used for such, even 
if it is not its (primary) purpose [2]. The ever increasing 
advances in computer sciences and technology have always 
been increasing the challenges faced by law enforcement, not 
only from a technological aspect, but also from the required 
imagination of how certain technology may be used, and the 
understanding that nothing is necessarily what it seems. 
The next advancement and almost routine step is 
encryption, which in an increasing amount of laptops, 
computers or storage devices is already enabled by default [13] 
[14], to the frustration of law enforcement [15]. Encryption 
specifically can apply selectively to any and all storage devices 
either in their entirety or selected areas or even only selected 
files or folders. However, while encryption is indeed 
noticeable, further free tools are available, with minimum user 
capabilities, to create hidden and encrypted areas of storage, 
which on initial inspection, and unless actively being looked 
for, will be difficult to even detect (the concept of plausible 
deniability) [16]. In essence it also allows the entry of a second 
password, similar to a panic code on an alarm – which gives 
the impression of having deactivated, while in reality it 
received a different command. 
Recently, with the development of Cloud computing 
platforms, cloud-based applications and new capabilities are 
emerging daily and bringing them lower cost of entry, pay-for-
use processor and data-storage models, greater scalability, 
improved performance, ease of redundancy and improved of 
business continuity. Hence, more and more users, organisations 
select cloud computing as a solution of their IT platforms and 
services. However, this also raises challenges for digital 
forensic investigators. This could mean that for example a 
given collection of evidence such as illicit material is either 
stored on the servers of a cloud provider, or maybe even across 
multiple cloud providers. Bearing in mind as well though that 
the country of operation of the cloud provider does not 
necessarily allow conclusions about the geographic location of 
one or more of its servers, which could be hosted in multiple 
countries – let alone reflecting on the possibility that the 
original cloud provider himself has subcontracted its services 
to other providers [18] [19]. This means in practical terms that 
the illicit material stored by the suspect is literally scattered in 
the clouds, and for all intents and purposes for gaining access 
to it, it may as well be from a law enforcement perspective, 
who would possibly be required to identify the various 
locations, issue specific and separate requests for mutual legal 
assistance, and then hope for a swift response from the various 
jurisdictions contacted [20]. The challenges also include in 
order of the discovery of a suspect / suspected activity, first of 
all the identification of the use of cloud services for storage. 
This could be an obvious one such as the use of a Dropbox 
account which is prominent on the desktop, or a Google Drive 
 icon, or even those provided immediately by the manufacturer 
of the device6 – but could also be less obvious solutions which 
are not immediately considered – such as using an email 
account itself for storing data in for example unsent messages / 
drafts. Should the use of cloud storage be suspected, and a 
specific provider is identified, the next challenge is the location 
of any stored material and its identification. Should the suspect 
not cooperate, the challenges increase – and increase to such an 
extent that the non-cooperation by the suspect as regards the 
provision of passwords itself has been made a criminal offence 
in a very pragmatic manner in some locations, such as in 
England and Wales [21]. 
The essential aspect to be examined and discussed in this 
paper is the scope to which extent the application of standard 
law enforcement investigative techniques and procedures of 
gathering evidence by use of e.g. court orders is indeed a 
sustainable approach. This can be questioned by comparing the 
uniqueness of the service providers in question, and the often 
complex structure of the providers own network or platform, 
with those of other industry areas. A cloud provider may as 
mentioned have stored the material in one location in its 
control, or may have spread it across multiple servers, or have 
no control at all about its whereabouts based on further 
subcontracting of the storage. In these situations it is hard to 
see what the best course of action is [32]. We also propose a 
solution to tackle these issues. The rest of this paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 shows background research in 
this area. We present and discuss on law enforcement 
requirements in Cloud forensics in Section 3. We describe and 
evaluate our approach in Section 4. Finally, we conclude and 
discuss on future work in Section 5. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we discuss on the essential Requirements, 
Governance and Challenges of Cloud Storage Service 
Providers. 
Cloud storage is a massive business area and the biggest 
difference is the scale to which they outsource their own 
services and act more of an intermediary, rather than a full-
service provider using their own infrastructure. The second 
difference is equally the size of their average client, and 
whether their primary business is the provision of entire servers 
to individual clients using high amounts of processing and / or 
storage, or whether the primary income is derived from 
services to the public (i.e. individuals), with a high ratio of 
clients to server (in which case naturally the removal of a 
server has a much bigger impact in the number of clients 
affected) [43]. 
This brings with it a number of specific challenges, when 
taking into account the need or even ability for private 
companies to be able to preserve or even access their own logs 
or infrastructure for forensic purposes12. As the challenge is 
large enough already at present, to simply gain access if you 
own the entire infrastructure, let alone if you do not, as is the 
case when data storage is possibly further sub-contracted. 
Additionally, due to a large part presumably to the heightened 
public awareness concerning data retention and collection, 
following the revelations by Snowden, companies are actually 
profiling themselves by being unable to provide logs or 
forensic evidence to law enforcement - see for example in this 
regard Apple, a market leader and a brand with a strong image 
as trend setters, publicly claiming that they are unable to 
comply with law enforcement request, as they cannot access 
users data (anymore) [44] [45]. From a conceptual level, this is 
achieved by basing the encryption key on the user’s individual 
pass code, making every encryption unique. This naturally 
brought strong criticism from the FBI, and various sources of 
law enforcement, but possibly contributed to Apple’s increased 
popularity (e.g. a rise of 67 percent from 2014) [47]. As a 
result, if this is the new standard that is being set, then other 
companies will need to follow suit – as Google has also 
recently announced to follow up this approach with one if its 
next Android version [48]. One could say that therefore this 
trend has already spilt over as a specific sales point towards 
other providers of cloud services. This indeed creates the 
question of what, other than binding legislation, would bring 
companies to cooperate, if the public attitude was pro-privacy, 
and against law enforcement, and further at the same time 
companies encrypt their own records beyond even their own 
retrieval possibilities, or don’t keep them at all. Especially as in 
the given circumstances even then the risk or threat by law 
enforcement of seizing servers or discontinuing their business 
is fruitless, as law enforcement would probably equally be 
unable to gain access to the data in a meaningful manner, hence 
making the entire seizure pointless in advance. Even stronger, 
where such a seizure would take place in any event, the 
businesses affected may well be in a strong position to claim 
damages due to the foreseeability of the damage and at the 
same time the non-existent likelihood of the success of any 
data recovery from the seized equipment. 
A. Requirement for encryption 
The utilisation of cloud storage commenced with business 
usage. As more and more businesses outsourced their data 
storage as well as in many cases business processes and 
running of software, the more the question of the security of 
the data was raised. This was initially a rare occurrence, but has 
increasingly become almost a daily occurrence. Additionally, 
while data originally being processed was limited to internal 
data, with the rise of commercial transactions taking place over 
the internet, and the ability to process credit cards off-site, the 
concrete value of the data became apparent, as did the 
consequences of a data breach, moving from an embarrassment 
(if anybody even found out) to actual significant financial 
damage. As a result, the processing of card details, is it under 
the data protection framework requiring appropriate measures 
to ensure data security, or be it under terms and conditions 
applicable to merchants from their banks, require in essence 
encryption. 
All recent data breaches which have reached the public 
nature, be it the JP Morgan breach [87], the PS Network [88], 
Sony Pictures [89], adult dating websites such as Adult 
FriendFinder [90] and the Ashley Madison website [91], as 
well as most recently the breach of The Hacking Team (which 
specialises in developing custom made malware for use by 
governments across the globe) [92], were severely criticised for 
not encrypting all of their data, such as passwords, user names, 
 or financial credit card details which resulted in either the 
publishing of the documents or data obtained, or may well be 
currently available for purchase in certain fora, or even used in 
blackmailing attempts at the company or the users exposed 
[93]. As such, one could reflect if the courts may also seem 
willing to apply an accusation of negligence, for not having 
encrypted their data. 
This is an ever increasing area of requirements, especially 
as hospitals move to store data in the cloud, allowing for easier 
information sharing, which contain the most sensitive data on a 
person, but equally explorations are ongoing for law 
enforcement and judicial authorities such as courts, to utilise 
cloud storage and cloud sharing. It goes without saying that a 
data breach of such an authorities cloud would cause outrage at 
plain text storage of such data. 
Naturally, and an obvious question now is, to what extent 
can you differentiate between good and bad encryption? As by 
its very definition, and the objection to encryption from a law 
enforcement perspective, is specifically to allow the evaluation 
of whether or not something illegal may be ongoing. As a 
result, it seems paradox to call for a prohibition of encryption if 
at the same time, it is an essential requirement. 
Equally, solutions such as what the author believes can be 
called pseudo-encryption, i.e. encryption, but with certain 
authorities possessing a master-key or backdoor, seem 
unsuitable as they would equally jeopardize the safety of all 
other material which is encrypted. It is also an unprecedented 
intrusion into the rights of all citizen, rather than a targeted 
approach intruding only on the liberties of one citizen, the 
suspect. Apart from the proportionality aspects, it would also 
face significant practical challenges [94], and most likely 
completely undermine any trust of citizens in government, and 
in the end lead to the development of new encryption strategies 
[95]. 
Overall, it can be held that encryption in a number of 
industries, including law enforcement, is not only best practice, 
but a business essential, without which no real secure 
environment required could ever be established in any event. 
A final aspect to raise is that even though encryption on its 
own may be seen as dangerous for specific groups, such as law 
enforcement, it is one of the only efficient defences against an 
ever increasing number and styles of cyber-attacks. With the 
prevalence of software, exploits, (semi)public availability of 
tutorials, and proportionally low cost rental availabilities of 
foreign servers or even individuals themselves, it is impossible 
to ensure that a system which is designed to be accessible from 
any location across the globe via the internet, will at one stage 
not be compromised and data stolen. Encryption therefore is 
understood to be the last line of defence, and as such, it cannot 
be outlawed safely. And this is the final point about mandatory 
encryption being required – the biggest security risk to any 
system is actually the user. Ranging from poor password 
selections, to the level of general awareness and understanding 
of computers and the internet – the user is in essence the most 
resilient to positive change, while at the same time being the 
most important. 
The number of examples available, from the average user 
unable to explain the difference between Google and the 
internet, or let alone between Google and Internet Explorer for 
example, to those that should know better abound mercilessly. 
Examples of the former, albeit indisputably non-academic 
examination and of a very colloquial nature are updated daily 
on Reddit’s Tales from Tech Support [96]. Examples of those 
who should be aware of their responsibilities and implement 
best practice concern the leaving of default passwords on road 
signs, ATMs, and Point of Sale Systems (i.e credit card and 
PIN terminals) [97], as well as the latest hack of the Hacker 
group, who are themselves at the forefront of compromising 
systems in the name of various governments, who neglected to 
enforce proper security on their own systems. And the final 
example in this respect, if it is even needed to provide evidence 
in support of a common truth, are the number of YouTube 
videos demonstrating external parties taking over control of 
baby monitors which are monitored from the internet – and 
should have had parents provide their own password [98]. 
The merit of all these seemingly unrelated arguments is that 
in the end internet security depends on the wrong or inaction of 
a user. And the fact that for example industry such as apple and 
Facebook and to an extent also Google, are moving towards 
default encryption just emphasizes this point. They believe 
(rightly) that the consumer cannot be trusted to make the right 
choices, so they will be made for him. The same applies in 
principle to Windows, which if every user of Windows updated 
all of their operating systems as prompted and even done 
automatically for the consumer if the user just allows it, would 
be the biggest blow, and if not the extinction, of the number of 
botnets in operation today (notwithstanding the number of 
illegal or compromised Windows OS originally installed, and 
which for example in China, where an estimated 90% of 
Windows users do not own a legitimate copy, and are reluctant 
to upgrade, as they are unsure whether they can bypass the 
security of the then upgraded system [99]). 
At present, the legal framework governing encryption is not 
in existence as regards the prohibition thereof. The only legal 
framework in existence that governs encryption, actually 
demands encryption, rather than prohibiting it, as stated above. 
Further, encryption can be seen as the last line of defence, 
and the setting of it as a default is, whilst a clear manner in 
which a decision is made for the user, without his real 
involvement, a necessary aspect to protect the user from his 
own actions. The outlawing of encryption, while providing a 
boost to law enforcement’s ability to investigate, would be 
more than outweighed by the additional number of 
investigations they would have to launch to deal with the 
floodgates on cybercrime having opened, combined with the 
increase of financial and economic loss – and quite possibly the 
end of e-commerce itself. This in general seems to have been 
accepted by law enforcement as well, as will be discussed next 
as regards the possibilities open to law enforcement. 
B. Encryption Techniques and Brute Forcing 
A brief and generic overview of encryption and password 
security is helpful to place the below concerning the needs for 
law enforcement and the proposed solution into context. There 
 are numerous papers, from articles to PhDs dedicated to how 
encryption works on a technical level. Upon to [102], the 
encryption has no real relevance on the ability to intercept or 
gain access to the material. What it does mean however, is that 
a ‘key’ is required to decrypt the content. As the key is user 
defined, it is now necessary to gain access in the absence of the 
user’s cooperation. The main approach can be called ‘brute 
force’. This is essence requires trying various possibilities one 
after the other. Generally, this follows the route of trying either 
a database of popular passwords (see e.g. 10 million passwords 
publically available collated from previous password breaches 
[103]) or simple dictionary words first, before moving to 
moving through the various character possibilities. 
Additionally, and upon initial reflection, with dedicated 
computer composition allowing for 3.3 billion guesses per 
second [106], it appears only a question of time until any and 
every password is found. This is indeed literally correct, yet the 
exponential factor of the time increase is often neglected, based 
on the presumed length of the password. For example, a 5 
character password, containing an uppercase letter, a lowercase 
letter, a number and a symbol, will take approximately 3 
months when a brute force attack is undertaken (ignoring the 
use of dictionaries or previous passwords), at 1000 guesses per 
second, which is the expected volume in an online attack [107]. 
An offline attack on the same password could reach one 
hundred billion guesses per second, and a dedicated attack on 
sophisticated high end equipment could even reach one 
hundred trillion guesses per second – in both cases, arriving at 
the 5 character password in less than a second. 
However, building on the exponentiality, and on the 
presumption that the composition of the password contain the 
four different types (i.e. at least one upper- and lowercase 
letter, a number and a symbol) we require a password length of 
ten, in order to challenge the dedicated attack scenario at 100 
trillion guesses per second – which would then take about a 
week. For general context, at this stage already, the online 
attack (at 1000 guesses per second) would take approximately 
19 million centuries to test all possible combinations, and even 
at 100 billion guesses per second, it would still take up to 19 
years. If one more digit is added to the password and the length 
reaches 11, the dedicated attack would still take up 2 years, but 
if one more digit is added, with a total length of 12, the time it 
would take to test all possible combinations would be around 
200 years, even at 100 trillion guesses per second. For 
comparison, the table below provides for an overview of the 
various scenarios: 
With the awareness of these figures, and despite the fact 
that even though we have been spending years “teaching 
humans to learn password which are easy to crack but hard to 
remember” [104], if humans to further that quote do change 
their passwords to non-dictionary, and non-routinely used 
passwords, and they move to 12 characters, the ability to brute 
force the passwords is not a reality. 
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT-LAW ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS 
As always, law enforcement, arguably due to the nature of 
being a public authority, and usually always outmatched as 
regards financial resources and priorities, is always a step 
behind in the development of new technologies and their usage 
for committing or concealing crime, albeit also this is 
changing. See here for example also the interaction of LEA 
with private companies in the development of new products, 
e.g. SKYPE and Microsoft, but also compared with pre- and 
post Snowden – with Apple as a global market leader providing 
default encryption which it itself states it cannot unlock. As 
business needs are driven by perceived consumer demand, this 
is a remarkable step which will likely be followed by other 
market leaders. That genuine law enforcement needs are 
hindered to an extent that fears of privacy intrusion outweigh 
the need can also be seen as a public backlash. 
Overall, the law enforcement authorities, in order to 
effectively combat cybercrime specifically, require the ability 
to translate traditional methods of investigations, such as 
surveillance, eavesdropping, wiretaps, or intercepts, to be 
applicable to modern means of communication, i.e. email, 
instant messaging, chat rooms, and even cloud services 
themselves, for example the use of web based email systems 
for storage. While most countries are in a position to apply 
existing national legislation in analogy, and some have specific 
legislation to assist this (especially those party to the Council 
of Europe Convention, as elaborated above), what is lacking is 
the ability to implement these measures from a technical 
perspective. Not only will the possibility exist for most users to 
encrypt all communication with free open source tools, but 
more importantly, and somewhat uniquely, especially as 
regards cloud forensics, is the fact that the law enforcement 
authorities depend to a very large degree on the provider 
having useable logs and tracking integrated into their own 
system platforms from an operational systems perspective / 
cloud management aspect. As without this third party data, 
there is no record of any crime being committed. And this 
dependency lies at the very heart of the potential conflict 
between law enforcement and cloud service providers. 
The main purpose of computer forensics is to gain, as with 
any other piece of evidence, as much information as possible 
from an object. The unique aspect of computer forensics relates 
to mainly two types of scenarios that require a degree of skill 
set or specialized software. One is the occasion whereby a 
computer system or any storage device needs to be assessed for 
deleted files or hidden or encrypted content, and ideally 
recovered, the other can probably be seen as occasions 
whereby a live system or network needs to be investigated and 
activity on a server for example reconstructed, and matched 
with potentially identified IP addresses or the like. Both 
scenarios would then also, depending on the investigative 
requirements, allow for social network analyses, of who is 
sending who emails, which contacts are in instant messaging 
tools, what chat history or logs are available, etc [130]. 
For cloud storage purposes, there are in essence two 
possibilities which open up, even though they may be 
generalized. Police may be dealing with a cooperative suspect, 
who provides them all the details about his account, from the 
provider, his username and password, and the location of any 
illegal material. In such a case, the forensic task is not as great, 
as armed with this information, the question is only concerning 
the recovery and the documentation of that access. 
 It becomes significantly more challenging, when dealing 
with a suspect who is believed to have access to cloud services, 
but whose devices are fully encrypted, and neither a specific 
company, nor a user name is known – let alone a password. In 
these scenarios, it is a painstaking process, which may even 
end fruitless – dependent on the level of encryption or traces of 
his internet activity from the Internet Service Provider itself, if 
it even keeps those records [131]. 
In such scenarios, if at least a company is identified that 
provides the service to the suspect, and then the next step 
would be to seek its cooperation. 
In conclusion, the needs for law enforcement which should 
be contained in any feasible solution take into account the 
operative need to be able to reconstruct events from a historical 
perspective, to be able to identify and gain access to certain 
accounts, as well as be able to obtain a copy of the data stored, 
combined with ideally a log of all activity pertaining to that 
account. 
However, from a more internal perspective, the largest 
requirement would be a dramatic increase in training and 
awareness – as here it can also be held that while police can 
and should be seen as an average reflection of members of 
society, this would also imply that the general awareness of 
cyber security and cybercrime, and the required user behavior 
in light of this, may also be somewhat lacking. 
Finally, an ability to obtain all the data required for their 
investigation, without the need to depend on external or third 
parties would be ideal. This would however imply receiving a 
cooperative suspect in all cybercrime cases, and this seems a 
slipper route to take. However, with a number of analogies, one 
of the solutions should consider this possibility of well of 
enforcing cooperation, also by the suspect himself. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Solving this problem, which is not exclusively related to the 
small snap-shot of cloud computing, but has significantly 
further reaching consequences as concerns general questions of 
moral values of a society, is not a simple undertaking. Rather, 
it requires a refined approach, and it also needs to reflect the 
fact that cloud computing specifically is cross-border, or most 
likely even without locatable physical locations – meaning a 
degree of global jurisdictional applicability is required [142]. 
In the following few chapters, it is intended to assess 
proposed solutions for their feasibility and likely impact on law 
enforcement, as well as service providers, and to develop from 
the various proposals as well as the various downsides, a new 
approach. 
It can be held that there are complex matters to be taken 
into account as regards all online crime, but specifically also 
the usage of cloud storage. Mainly in literature this aspect has 
been approached from the point of view of law enforcement 
and judicial complications, but not really from a business need 
perspective. While I suppose a reason for this lays in the rather 
limited amount of cloud storage providers over the past, and 
that being mainly a business oriented market with clear 
dominating powers, which is changing fast. As described 
previously, the market is becoming less and less dominated by 
main players, and creates a lot of room for localized cloud 
storage markets, including for personal use. 
This means that in general terms, the larger the company, 
and the more equally law enforcement is dependent on their 
cooperation and good will, the clearer the informal 
arrangements between the two – and law enforcement enquiries 
or investigations no longer pose a business continuity threat to 
the providers. This changes, if the market is flooded with new 
companies, which either do not wish to take a cooperative 
approach with law enforcement (while however still being 
strict about their content and services, but the lack of 
cooperation being based on privacy concerns and a strict 
adherence to legal procedure and process), or which are simply 
unaware of the impact law enforcement action could have on 
their business. 
This by definition makes the entire question of this thesis 
more relevant again, as how should the market behave? This 
has never really been truly examined. This is also why in the 
below proposals, I will address and provide proposals focused 
on law enforcement and judicial aspects, but also provide 
solutions based on the business side of commercial cloud 
storage providers. 
A. A clear legal environment in which the business operates 
Taking into account the previous aspects raised as concerns 
the questions of jurisdictional applicability, any business needs 
to know the legal environment in which it operates. However, 
there are specific challenges for a cloud storage provider, or 
also a cloud service provider in more general terms, based on 
the geographic location of its actual storage facility. It would 
appear from the various terms and conditions applicable to the 
provision of services, that the majority of the providers 
nominate a court / jurisdiction applicable to the contract of 
service. However, this contract cannot override national law. 
And as such, a storage provider with multiple places of 
business, which most storage providers are, by virtue of the 
irrelevance of the physical location of its customer, will have to 
take into account multiple jurisdictions. As much as possible, 
this should therefore be avoided, and a degree of protection 
needs to be afforded to service providers, to know the terms of 
their engagement – and if need be, for example, have the 
liberty to exclude customers based in jurisdictions where the 
terms of engagement are not acceptable to the provider. 
A feasible solution therefore must allow a business to make 
an informed decision on its operating environment, even if it 
does operate in a field freed to a large extent from 
geographically meaningful boundaries. 
B. A clear legal environment for its interaction with law 
enforcement 
A more specific subsection of legal clarity comes as regards 
the need to interact with law enforcement, and more 
specifically, what the possibilities for law enforcement are in 
that jurisdiction. It can not be the case that a business, when 
assessing one of its biggest and mission critical risks, has to 
rely on policy decisions in force at the time, based on the 
discretion of a judge able to issue a warrant, or the practice of 
 the respective prosecutor. If it were subject only to the question 
of individual preferences and discretion, rather than concrete 
and specific legislation, it would, if wise, either opt not to 
operate in that jurisdiction, or to see itself forced to cooperate 
in an anticipatory manner, for fear of losing the business. 
As such it needs to be clear, and that can only be done by 
explicit legislation, applicable to the specific sector, what can 
and cannot be done. Relying on the interpretation of legislation 
in force significantly before the emergence of the various 
technologies, the internet itself, or as a result of ill-informed 
legislators (while having good intentions), creating laws which 
have no real direct bearing on the process. 
C. A clear ability to maintain business continuity 
Apart from the technical causes that may cause system 
outages, be it from electronic causes, events of nature, or a pipe 
bursts, etc., there should be no other threat emanating towards 
its business continuity, and especially not from the side of law 
enforcement. This all pre-supposes naturally that the services 
offered by the business are indeed legal, and that there is no 
criminal activity conducted by it, or condoned / supported / 
encouraged by it. However, as regards the concerns of business 
continuity, it cannot be the case that the suspected engagement 
of one of their customers is an inherent business risk to the 
provider. 
D. A clear ability to provide services to clients, without being 
responsible for the content 
Any responsibility for the content stored on the cloud 
provider’s systems cannot be made the business’s 
responsibility. The situation is clearer as regards for example 
internet service providers, telephone companies – infrastructure 
providers in general. The moment the cloud provider is by 
default responsible for matters hosted on its servers, will be the 
moment that the cloud will no longer be able to be used by 
businesses, law enforcement, or any other person with a 
legitimate need to protect their data from third parties. 
This is therefore an essential requirement, as equally from a 
provider perspective, the amount of staff it would take, as well 
as possibly skill, to review every bit of data stored in their 
cloud, would make the entire business model collapse. 
E. A clear relationship of trust with the customer 
The cloud provider needs to be able to assure the client that 
his data will be safe, inaccessible to third parties or the 
provider itself, and that the client can entrust his data to the 
provider, and see it in essence as an extension of his own desk 
or living room or garage – wherever else he may have stored 
the data otherwise. 
If this trust is violated or not present to begin with, the 
company will not survive. And especially the possible pressure 
of advance or proactive compliance with law enforcement 
requests, for example those not supported by a warrant, 
damage such trust. Equally, data breaches and security 
breaches damage it – but not to a massive extent, if the data is 
encrypted. 
F. Summary of needs of Storage Providers and Law 
Enforcement 
It is easily summarized that the needs of a cloud provider 
(from a non-technical aspect, but limited to the scope of this 
paper), require clarity – simply and foremost: clarity on the 
jurisdictional aspects, clarity on the abilities of law 
enforcement, and clarity on questions of liability. So any 
feasible solution must contain this one core ingredient. The 
outcome of the clarity may not be necessarily in the best 
interest from a business perspective, but at least then an 
informed decision can be made about the establishment of a 
branch or headquarters, or the provision of services to a 
specific country or area. 
From a law enforcement perspective the main requirements 
are almost identical, in the sense of requiring also a need for a 
clear legal framework in which to operate, and an ability to 
gain access to data it requires in a non-time or resource 
consuming and efficient manner, while naturally having a 
lawful order from the court to do so. 
G. Way forward 
We, upon reflection and the acknowledgement of all of the 
above discussed aspects, comes to the following proposed 
solution. This is primarily based on the realization of two 
aspects, namely that laws need to be seen to function, in the 
absence of which no meaningful policing can take place, and 
secondly, that with the advent of the internet, and the Snowden 
revelations just being a catalyst for this belated realization, a 
significant change has entered into the expectations of society, 
namely that a small part of our lives is governed by near 
anarchy, where anything goes and no one is accountable to 
anything, for anything or to anyone. This refuge from the daily 
laws and regulated life worked arguably fine, but has now 
become such a dominant part of our lives, that the status quo is 
not maintainable, as much as it may be desirable by some 
parties. 
We believe firmly in the rule of law and the role of the law, 
albeit from a legal realist point of view if one takes into 
account the legal philosophy behind the entire construction. 
In full awareness that the common law system is as far as 
the main focus concerns the European Union, is rather in 
minority, the principle nonetheless must remain valid for any 
legal system that seeks to be respected and complied with. 
The question of forensic evaluation or obtaining of access 
to cloud services for law enforcement is a necessity and 
question which was not really an issue or even perceived 
challenge a decade ago. To date however, it has become a 
reality, and law enforcement has proceeded to attempt to apply 
their existing tools and abilities, and come to the realization, 
that in all aspects, it seems counterproductive (by alienating the 
service providers on whose cooperation they depend), 
expensive (forensic in and external evaluations and data 
recovery, storage of seized devices), and non-timely (taking 
into account backlogs). What is required is therefore an 
acceptance that the virtualization of near everything, at present, 
as well as thinking slightly ahead of the buzz words of the 
Internet of Things, is a challenge for law enforcement that does 
 not possess the skill set or the ability to obtain what it needs – 
and not due to lack of skill or financial involvement. 
Rather this is due to the fundamental nature of things. In the 
absence of a totalitarian supervision and monitoring of all 
activity of all citizens, police will be unable to proceed to gain 
access to what is needed. And here is an essential aspect when 
talking about what the police need to gain to conduct their 
investigation: If the police have a need, which involves 
obtaining something that requires a violation of an individual’s 
right, i.e. the application of coercive powers, the police attend 
the court. The court then issues an order – which is binding on 
anyone it is directed at – such is the basic premise of our legal 
systems. This applies in civil disputes as much as in criminal 
cases, the court is the highest and only authority in the land 
which all citizens must obey. 
The unique aspect here, and this is the key realization, is 
that to date, there is nothing comparable that the court can 
authorize the police to obtain, which the police cannot obtain 
themselves by force or other means in the obtaining of their 
goal. As a suitable analogy, if police apply for a warrant or 
order to search a house, in the lack of compliance of the owner 
or tenant, they can force their way in, within a reasonably short 
time frame. The same applies to any vault or the like found on 
the premises or subject to a warrant. What it does not apply to 
is the gaining of access to encrypted information. While 
methodologies exist to break encryption, dependent on the type 
of encryption utilized and the user chosen complexity of 
passwords (and here police may gain a break, considering the 
type of standard passwords chosen, but that is beside the point), 
they may take a disproportionate amount of time (up to 
multiple years if a secure password was chosen, and the only 
approach was brute force). The same, especially as regards to 
cloud storage and the connection to the storage, is applicable to 
live systems. Once a live system is shut down, the connections 
active at the time, as well as the probably unencrypted state of 
the hard drive(s), are likely to have been lost, possibly forever. 
This means in essence that compared to any other coercive 
measure, ranging from highly intimate intrusions into a persons 
physical integrity like forced cavity searches, provision of 
medication to force a person to be sick, if they are suspected of 
having evidence in their stomach, such as drugs, to the more 
mundane of being ordered to provide a DNA sample, this is 
one of the only court orders available against a suspect, which 
the police cannot enforce. So what is they way forward when 
focusing on a valid order of a court, which the police cannot 
force compliance with or obtain by force on their own? In all 
other instances, for example in civil cases, if a court order is 
not followed or acted upon, or even when individuals are 
compelled to give testimony but refuse, what are the options of 
a court? To hold the individual in contempt of court. And this 
is a notion that has routinely been seen as an option in civil 
cases, with individuals being subject to considerable amount of 
time in court (at least in the US, the record stands at 14 years, 
based on the fact that he could comply with a civil order to 
transfer assets to his divorced wife, but simply refused to do so 
[144]). Most notably, in civil contempt cases, there is no 
principle of proportionality, which is the case in criminal 
contempt cases however, and hence the distinction is vital 
[145]. 
In criminal contempt matters, the subject matter of the 
current proposal made here, a principle of proportionality is 
essential, as are the existence of procedural rights for the 
subject, to for example submit a defense of impossibility. This 
follows very much the line taken by the United Kingdom’s Key 
disclosure law. 
As a general principle, this paper then proposes, taking into 
account: 
- the uniqueness of the technological situation and problems 
faced, 
- the need for service providers to be able to operate 
without undue interference from law enforcement 
investigations, both from a business continuity aspect as well 
as from the perspective of constantly being subject to court 
orders obliging them to provide password credentials or to 
decipher content stored on their systems 
- the need for creating a situation whereby the law 
enforcement effectiveness is not dependent on third party 
compliance, and 
- the accepted root concept of legality, the ultimate binding 
nature of court decisions and orders on every citizen, the core 
base upon which ultimately society is built 
- the established context of contempt of court and its 
widespread use in civil cases 
to create specific legislation on a national level, outlining 
the guidelines for the appropriate sentencing measures, to allow 
for individuals to be held in contempt of court for non-
compliance with court orders to produce access to established 
storage deemed in his possession, while also ensuring that 
sufficient procedural safeguards are available. The reason this 
paper does not agree with the criminalization of the specific 
withholding of information, is that this is a determinate 
sentence. In cases of contempt of court, the accused continues 
to hold the key to his release, quite literally, and can be 
released at any time upon the production of the required access 
information. This retains also the spirit of the general principle 
of contempt, which is in essence seen as a coercive measure 
aimed at obtaining compliance. (And in German Law, the 
concept is known as “Beugehaft”, which if literally translated, 
is the taking into custody (“haft”) for the purposes of literally 
bending him over (“Beuge”) , in the sense of submitting.) 
Consequences of Encryption 
Also in this respect, the problem is in essence removed, as 
the requirement to remove the encryption is burdened upon the 
suspect – not for ease and convenience, but because otherwise 
it would fundamentally inhibit any, let alone efficient, law 
enforcement. 
As a consequence as well, the entire move of the industry 
towards encryption by default, which is still a large hindrance 
and obstacle for some law enforcement investigations, and 
significantly so it is presumed for intelligence agencies, is 
however largely inconsequential. Additionally, it would have 
the benefit of avoiding the reflexive need for cloud providers to 
move towards encryption, for fear of significant impacts on 
their business continuity. 
 Risks 
The identifiable risk that appears most prominent is public 
reaction to such a proposal, as it would appear as a new 
concept, near Orwellian, to oblige a suspect to assist in his own 
conviction. If this were the case, any outrage would be justified 
as it would be incompatible with a functioning democracy and 
the rule of law. However, it is not that – rather, it is simply an 
application of existing rights of the court, in existence for as 
long as the existence of the courts themselves, and applied in 
order to achieve the implementation of a court order – which 
would otherwise be impossible to fulfill. Equally, what would 
be the point of the court ordering anything, what authority 
would a court possess, if its orders were in essence 
meaningless for lack of inability to enforce compliance? 
Mitigation 
Possible additional measures to complement the contempt 
specifications could be that criminal courts could refer the 
matter to a specialized court or tribunal, where specific 
membership and selection criteria as regards the judicial 
composition of it apply, ensuring only specialized judges are in 
a position to make informed decisions, and could maybe even 
include a member of an independent body dealing with civil 
rights. 
These sorts of specialized courts already exist in a number 
of different areas, from employment tribunals, to special courts 
dealing with national security implications of cases, so an 
additional specialized court may well have merit, dependent on 
how strong the risk is perceived that ordinary judges holding 
criminal cases may be unable to deal and understand the 
complexities of cloud storage or the like. 
What is also an additional benefit is the fact that in 
exchange for example for the shift in the application of these 
powers and the coherent national policies applicable to them 
when created, would mean that the necessity for example of 
obliging cloud providers to store all information about all of 
their customers, in decipherable format, is no longer as 
essential. While the establishment of a historic behavior may 
still be highly relevant, normal forensic evaluation should 
allow the establishment of such a picture when required. The 
point is therefore precisely this – it is not about having the 
suspect convict himself, it is rather the suspect giving the key 
to his house, in the absence of the ability of the Police to force 
entry, in the exercise of a judicial warrant. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The usage of cloud storage for criminal purposes is well 
known and will most likely not end. The eradication of crime is 
equally a noble cause, yet not one which seems a realistic 
prospect, and without any intention of entering into a 
philosophical discourse on human nature and societies. The 
fact that criminals and crime and their methods will continue to 
evolve in pace with and take advantage of technological 
development and innovations, is equally acknowledged. And 
the central aspect is that this is not necessarily an existential 
threat. It can equally be anticipated, that encryption, despite the 
strong concerns expressed within the US (where the Director of 
the FBI stated that he could not understand why companies 
“market something expressly to allow people to place 
themselves beyond the law”) [147], most vocally within the EU 
by David Cameron [148], will be an increasing feature and 
become the norm. 
As such, the proposed solution of moving away from 
expressing concerns about encryption, and moving towards 
individual responsibility and accepting the advancement of 
technology sometimes requiring an adaptation of law, should 
find less objection, as it specifically acknowledges the concerns 
about mass-surveillance and privacy of the individual, and 
makes the decryption an individualized order, rather than a 
mainstream standardization. 
In this context of mass surveillance, a significant change of 
mindset and public perception of what normality is, has taken 
place, and will be hard to reverse. Trust, in its very essence, 
regardless of it being trust in public authority or government, is 
easily lost – and it takes a long time to restore, if it is possible 
at all. The manner in which generally the public has used the 
internet has been with a complete disregard to individual 
privacy protection, disregard for any terms and conditions and 
blind acceptance in general, including giving up their eldest 
child for free wifi-access [149], and those that were focused on 
security and privacy, including in their daily internet use, 
considered fanatics or conspiracy theorists. Even criminal 
activity is ongoing in a clear and transparent manner at large 
volumes, which is easy to detect and investigate, albeit time 
consuming, based on police being confronted with a “tsunami 
of filth” [150] (as concerns for example the United Kingdom, a 
recent report found that on average, 2 people a day are being 
convicted for possession of child abuse material, relating to 
approx 4.5 million images seized [151]). However, if the 
standard moves by default, even the high volume of for 
example child abuse material being collected and shared is 
moved into encryption, the work for law enforcement is 
dramatically multiplied. 
Yet to stop the tide moving towards encryption, and 
specifically outside of the easy remit of law enforcement, will 
be a big undertaking – and for all intents and purposes, a non-
productive approach in any event. As such, it is essential that 
law enforcement seek to cooperate as much as possible with 
private parties in the sector, and equally encourage them to 
embrace and accept their own responsibility in preventing the 
use of their systems for criminal activity (even if not 
necessarily a legal obligation, as can be seen from the zero 
knowledge approach adopted by a number of cloud providers, 
but rather their ‘moral’ obligation towards society). 
It is only through creating this codependency, or rather co-
responsibility, that action may be effective. As this however 
goes against the very point of encryption from a user – side, i.e. 
the concept of self-defense of the industry against being seen as 
law enforcement cooperative, it is going to require legislation 
to achieve in all likelihood. And specifically the type of 
legislation proposed in the solution in this paper would 
precisely provide the outcome of desire to all parties 
considered here – citizen, business and law enforcement. 
Overall, the continuous development of cloud and 
virtualization services is permeating from a business exclusive 
aspect, to a mainstream consumer product. At the same time, 
 encryption as demonstrated extensively above is equally 
advancing into a main stream feature. This has the potential to 
become a perfect storm for law enforcement investigations, at 
least as regards the currently deployed tactics. Equally, from a 
business provider’s aspect, it is the ideal scenario, of being 
incapable of being blamed or held accountable for the abuse of 
its own services for criminal purposes, and that inability to 
detect it being in essence the fundamental business model. 
There is little detectable self-interest in offering a service 
which offers less security on the basis that this will make work 
easier for law enforcement – especially if one is thereby in the 
minority in the industry, as less safety has never really been a 
selling point. And the fact that if a consumer uses one specific 
company for their cloud and virtualization services, and by 
reputation this makes them an honest, and transparent 
customer, is not really something to build a business case on. 
To date, the need for encryption, in its extreme form, bullet-
proof hosting, or the use of Tor, has always had a publicly 
general connotation of the need to hide something, suggesting 
illegality. The service providers equally wished to remove 
connotations of illegality being a business model, and as such 
avoided that. With the switch however now, this is no longer 
the case – rather, there is no longer a contradiction between 
having nothing to hide and acting illegally. The black and 
white approach of having nothing to hide, and hence having no 
objection to being potentially watched, while still being 
prevalent in a lot of countries in the public, is not taken on 
board anymore by business – and hence there is no stigma 
attached to encryption and ensuring one’s own privacy. 
With the proposed (re-)introduction of the superiority and 
binding nature of the orders of a court to any citizen in its 
jurisdiction, society will ideally be able to reflect and realize 
that indeed, the notion of mass surveillance is at least in its 
current format, coming to an end – and that the intention 
pursued by law enforcement is not to know everything, about 
everyone at any time, but rather to be in a position to tackle 
specifically organized crime and terrorism, which should not 
be thwarted based on business decisions by private industry. 
Will the proposed solution make everyone happy? No. Will it 
hinder law enforcement in their investigations of volume based 
child abuse material investigations? Probably yes. Is this 
however a price to pay, to lead police to adopt and focus their 
resources on higher value targets, and to provide a feeling of 
privacy towards the citizen, with the ultimate result hopefully 
being a commencement of the rebuilding of trust towards law 
enforcement and government? Yes, the author feels strongly 
that this is the case, and is hopeful that the humble proposals 
made, the arguments advanced, and the overall value of this 
paper will see some discussion towards this goal. 
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